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Policies for Increasing Economic 
Growth and Employment in 2010 and 2011
Introduction and Summary
After the most severe recession since the 1930s, the U.S. 
economy appears to be recovering. Real (inflation-
adjusted) gross domestic product (GDP) grew during the 
third quarter of 2009, after having fallen 3.7 percent since 
the recession began in the fourth quarter of 2007. How-
ever, the economy’s output is still about 7 percent below 
the Congressional Budget Office’s (CBO’s) estimate of 
potential GDP—the output the economy would produce 
if its resources were fully employed. From December 2007 
to December 2009, the unemployment rate jumped from 
4.9 percent to 10.0 percent, and payrolls fell by about 
7.2 million jobs.1 Moreover, if employment had grown 
during this period at the same rate at which it had grown 
from 1990 to 2007, millions of additional jobs would have 
been added to the economy during that period; all told, 
the recession has lowered employment by about 11 million 
relative to what it would otherwise be. Nearly all profes-
sional forecasters believe that the economy has passed the 
trough of the recession, but many also predict that the 
pace of the recovery will be slow. In its August 2009 report 
The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update, CBO 
projected that the unemployment rate would not fall 
below 8 percent again until 2012 (see Figure 1).
The federal tax system and social safety-net programs 
automatically dampen swings in economic activity by 
decreasing tax payments to the government and increas-
ing benefit payments to households when economic 
activity slows (and by having the opposite effect when 
economic activity quickens). That automatic stabilizing 
effect is quite timely because it does not require legislative 
action. As the recession deepened in 2008 and early 
2009, declines in real household income and business 
profits caused tax receipts to fall and outlays on safety-net 
programs, such as unemployment compensation, to rise. 
Those changes kept demand for goods and services by 
consumers and businesses stronger than it would have 
been otherwise, which in turn kept production and 
employment from falling as much as they would have 
otherwise. A simple measure of the impact of the auto-
matic stabilizers is their effect on the federal budget defi-
cit. By CBO’s estimate, those stabilizers added roughly 
$300 billion to the federal budget deficit in fiscal year 
2009 and are projected to add about $400 billion in each 
of fiscal years 2010 and 2011.
Those induced changes in the federal budget are comple-
mented by similar but smaller automatic changes in state 
and local budgets. In contrast with automatic stabilizers 
at the federal level, however, those at the state and local 
level are largely offset by discretionary actions needed to 
comply with states’ balanced-budget rules. Those actions 
include reductions in state and local spending and 
increases in tax rates and various fees.
The government has also taken specific actions to address 
the turmoil in the housing and financial markets and the 
severe recession. To stabilize those markets, the Federal 
Reserve, the Department of the Treasury, and other agen-
cies lowered the target for the federal funds rate—the rate 
that the Federal Reserve uses to implement monetary 
1. The number of net job losses is based on official data at the time 
of writing and does not take into account the Bureau of Labor Sta-
tistics’ (BLS’s) benchmark revision (the annual reanchoring of the 
employment estimates to full population counts available princi-
pally through unemployment insurance tax records) scheduled for 
early February. In a preliminary announcement, BLS indicated 
that March 2009 employment would probably be revised down-
ward by about 800,000. Accounting for that revision, the number 
of net job losses since December 2007 would be about 8 million. 
Estimates of employment growth since March 2009 may also be 
revised.
2 POLICIES FOR INCREASING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT IN 2010 AND 2011
CBO
Figure 1.
The Unemployment Rate
(Percent)
Source: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.
Notes: Data are quarterly and are plotted through the fourth quarter 
of 2016.
The National Bureau of Economic Research establishes the 
dates on which recessions begin and end but has not yet 
done so for the end of the most recent recession. The 
shaded bar indicates the duration of that recession, which is 
shown as having ended in the second quarter of 2009.
a. CBO’s economic forecast is being updated; the revised forecast 
will be published later in January.
policy—to almost zero, provided equity and loans to 
financial institutions, guaranteed debt issued by financial 
institutions, and put the Federal National Mortgage 
Association (Fannie Mae) and the Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (Freddie Mac) into conservator-
ship.2 To boost the economy, the government enacted 
several fiscal stimulus bills, including the Economic Stim-
ulus Act in February 2008 (Public Law 110-85); the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA, 
P.L. 111-5) in February 2009; and the Worker, Home-
ownership, and Business Assistance Act (WHBAA, 
P.L. 111-92) in November 2009 (see Box 1). Those 
pieces of legislation included increases in federal spending 
and reductions in taxes that boosted demand for goods 
and services—similar to the effect of the automatic fiscal 
stabilizers. 
The fiscal stimulus that has been enacted will continue to 
add to demand in coming years, although the amount of 
stimulus will begin to diminish after the middle of 2010. 
By last September, when fiscal year 2009 ended, about 
one-fifth of the spending authority and tax cuts provided 
in ARRA had been spent or implemented. According to 
estimates by CBO and the staff of the Joint Committee 
on Taxation, ARRA will add to federal spending or 
reduce revenues by about $400 billion in fiscal year 2010, 
by more than $100 billion in fiscal year 2011, and by 
smaller amounts thereafter. By CBO’s estimate, the eco-
nomic effects of ARRA—including direct and indirect 
effects—will peak in the first half of 2010. After that 
point, the stimulus will still be adding to demand but by 
smaller amounts. Consequently, although it will still help 
hold up the levels of GDP, its effect on growth will turn 
negative.
Future economic activity will also be affected by sched-
uled changes in tax law. In 2011, taxes will rise substan-
tially because the tax cuts provided by the Economic 
Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 and 
the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2003 will expire and because the exemption amount for 
the alternative minimum tax (AMT) will fall (see Box 2 
on page 6). (The AMT is an alternative tax originally 
intended to impose taxes on high-income individuals 
who use tax preferences to greatly reduce or eliminate 
their liability under the regular income tax.) Compared 
with an alternative path in which the tax cuts were 
extended and the exemption amount for the AMT 
was indexed, the rise in taxes under current law will 
increase tax revenue by roughly $300 billion in 2011, 
CBO estimates.3
In addition, it appears that the stimulus to economic 
activity provided by monetary policy is no longer increas-
ing. To offset the sharp contraction in the provision of 
credit by the private sector that has occurred since the 
financial crisis began in 2007, the Federal Reserve 
has reduced the federal funds rate to almost zero and has 
initiated a number of special programs to increase the 
supply of credit. Those actions, as well as actions by 2. For a summary of actions taken by the Federal Reserve, the 
Department of the Treasury, and other agencies in support of the 
housing and financial markets as of August 2009, see Congressio-
nal Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Outlook: An Update 
(August 2009), Tables B-1 to B-3.
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Actual CBO’s August 2009 Forecasta
3. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Out-
look: An Update, Box 2-2. 
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the Treasury Department and other agencies, have helped 
stabilize the financial sector and support economic activ-
ity, and financial institutions’ use of the Federal Reserve’s 
liquidity programs has now fallen markedly. In the early 
phases of most past recoveries, the Federal Reserve has cut 
interest rates, but it does not seem likely that the Federal 
Reserve will provide additional monetary stimulus going 
forward. 
Other considerations also suggest that increases in pro-
duction and gains in employment will be modest for 
some time. The supply of credit is still limited by many 
financial institutions’ ongoing losses on past loans and 
the desire to rebuild their capital. The number of vacant 
houses remains quite high, reducing the need for new res-
idential construction. And consumers probably want to 
rebuild their savings after large losses in stock and hous-
ing wealth, which will hold down growth in consumer 
spending. 
Concerns that the economic recovery will be slow and 
protracted have therefore prompted the consideration of 
further fiscal policy actions. For example, in December, 
the House of Representatives passed H.R. 2847, which 
would extend unemployment assistance, increase infra-
structure spending, and provide more aid to state govern-
ments. In previous reports and testimony, CBO identi-
fied three key criteria for judging policy options for 
spurring economic growth and increasing employment:
B Timing—providing help when it is needed most;
B Cost-effectiveness—providing the most growth and 
employment per dollar cost to the federal budget; and 
B Consistency with long-term fiscal objectives—pre-
venting a short-term deficit increase due to stimulative 
policy from adding excessively to federal debt in the 
long run. 
Other considerations affecting the design of policy 
options include uncertainty about a policy’s effectiveness, 
the distribution of benefits among different people, and 
the value of additional goods and services that would be 
produced.4
This paper summarizes the current economic outlook, 
reviews criteria for setting fiscal policy under such eco-
nomic conditions, and assesses the potential impact on 
output and employment of a variety of policy options. 
Some options would reduce taxes on individuals or 
increase aid to the unemployed and others, increasing the 
disposable income of households and thus boosting 
demand. Other options would increase cash flow and 
reduce taxes for firms, which would encourage firms to 
invest and hire and thus increase employment. Additional 
options would increase federal spending by investing in 
infrastructure or providing aid to state governments, 
which would strengthen demand for goods and services 
and reduce further losses of state and local government 
jobs. 
CBO concludes that further policy action, if properly 
designed, would promote economic growth and increase 
employment in 2010 and 2011. The policies analyzed 
vary in cost-effectiveness as measured by the cumulative 
effects on GDP and employment per dollar of budgetary 
cost and in the time patterns of those effects. Policies that 
could be implemented relatively quickly or targeted 
toward people whose consumption tends to be restricted 
by their income, such as reducing payroll taxes for firms 
that increase payroll or increasing aid to the unemployed, 
would have the largest effects on output and employment 
per dollar of budgetary cost in 2010 and 2011. By con-
trast, policies that would temporarily increase the after-
tax income of people with relatively high income, such as 
an across-the-board reduction in income taxes or an 
increase in the exemption amount for the AMT, would 
have smaller effects because such tax cuts would probably 
not affect the recipients’ spending significantly.
Despite the potential economic benefits in the short run, 
such actions would add to the already large projected 
budget deficits. Unless offsetting actions were taken to 
reverse the accumulation of additional government debt, 
future incomes would tend to be lower than they other-
wise would have been. 
4. Congressional Budget Office, Options for Responding to Short-Term 
Economic Weakness (January 2008); and Statement of Douglas W. 
Elmendorf, Director, Congressional Budget Office, before the 
House Committee on the Budget, The State of the Economy and 
Issues in Developing an Effective Policy Response (January 27, 2009). 
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Continued
Box 1.
Fiscal Stimulus Legislation Enacted in 2008 and 2009
Several fiscal stimulus bills were enacted in 2008 and 
2009, including the Economic Stimulus Act; the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA); 
and the Worker, Homeownership, and Business Assis-
tance Act (WHBAA). 
Economic Stimulus Act of 2008
The Economic Stimulus Act (Public Law 110-185) 
was enacted on February 13, 2008. Qualified individ-
ual taxpayers and married couples filing joint tax 
returns received tax rebates of up to $600 and $1,200, 
respectively, and an additional $300 rebate for each 
qualified dependent child under age 17. In addition, 
people who did not pay income taxes but who had at 
least $3,000 of income from earnings, Social Security 
benefits, and certain veterans’ benefits were eligible for 
such payments. 
The act also contained tax benefits for businesses. It 
permitted an additional first-year depreciation deduc-
tion for qualified property placed in service in 2008; 
most depreciable investment other than long-lasting 
structures qualified. The provision is often referred to 
as bonus depreciation. The act also increased the max-
imum amount of investment that smaller firms could 
treat as a current expense in lieu of depreciating it over 
time. That amount was raised from $128,000 to 
$250,000 for qualifying property placed in service in 
2008, subject to certain limits. Both changes tempo-
rarily increased the after-tax cash flow of businesses 
purchasing new plant and equipment and reduced the 
cost of those investments.
American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act of 2009
ARRA (P.L. 111-5), enacted on February 17, 2009, 
provided tax benefits for individuals and businesses; 
increased or extended certain benefits for various 
social safety-net programs; and appropriated funding 
for spending on aid to state governments (including 
education and health care programs) and on infra-
structure (including transportation, energy, and water 
projects).1 
Among its tax benefits to individuals, ARRA provided 
the Making Work Pay credit of up to $400 to individ-
uals and $800 to married taxpayers filing joint returns 
in 2009 and 2010. The credit phases out with modi-
fied adjusted gross income—that is, adjusted gross 
income used to determine federal income taxes, modi-
fied to remove the exclusion for foreign earned income 
and income from Puerto Rico—in excess of $75,000 
for individuals and $150,000 for married couples fil-
ing jointly. ARRA also temporarily expanded the 
earned income tax credit by increasing the amount of 
the credit for taxpayers with three or more qualifying 
children and raising the income threshold at which the 
amount of the credit begins to be reduced for married 
couples filing jointly. In addition, the act modified the 
existing Hope credit (a federal tax credit for education 
expenses of students meeting certain criteria) in 2009 
and 2010 by making the credit partially refundable, by 
extending the benefits to a broader class of taxpayers, 
and by allowing the credit to be claimed for four years 
of postsecondary education instead of two. Further, 
ARRA increased the refundability of the child tax 
credit; it did so by reducing the amount of earned 
income at which people without any income tax liabil-
ity become eligible for the credit. 
ARRA also modified the tax credit for first-time 
homebuyers, increasing the maximum credit to 
$8,000 with no payback required unless the home 
ceased to be a taxpayer’s principal residence within 
three years.2 The credit phases out for individuals 
earning more than $75,000 and for married couples 
earning more than $150,000. The amended home-
buyer credit was set to expire on November 30, 2009, 
but was extended and expanded by WHBAA. 
1. For cost estimates and analysis of the economic effects of 
ARRA, see Congressional Budget Office, “Estimated Macro-
economic Impacts of the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act of 2009,” letter to the Honorable Charles E. 
Grassley (March 2, 2009); and Congressional Budget Office, 
Estimated Impact of the American Recovery and Reinvestment 
Act on Employment and Economic Output as of September 
2009 (November 2009). 
2. The first-time homebuyer credit was initially enacted by the 
Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-289) 
and was required to be repaid over a period of time.
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Box 1. Continued
Fiscal Stimulus Legislation Enacted in 2008 and 2009
Among its tax benefits to businesses, ARRA extended 
the provisions of the Economic Stimulus Act regard-
ing expensing and bonus depreciation for another year 
(through 2009). It also allowed small businesses that 
had net operating losses for a taxable year ending or 
beginning in 2008 to carry back those losses (that is, 
use the losses to reduce tax liability in an earlier 
period) for five years and to reclaim taxes previously 
paid. To be eligible, the business must have an average 
of less than $15 million in gross receipts over a three-
year period ending with the year in which the loss to 
be carried back occurred.
ARRA also increased spending on benefit programs 
for individuals. Benefits for the Supplemental Nutri-
tion Assistance Program (formerly called Food 
Stamps) were increased, and a one-time payment was 
made to Social Security recipients, people on Supple-
mental Security Income, and veterans receiving dis-
ability benefits and pensions. The act increased 
unemployment insurance benefits by $25 per week 
and extended the period for which benefits would be 
paid to individuals who exhaust their regular unem-
ployment benefits by the end of 2009.3 (WHBAA fur-
ther expanded unemployment benefits, and the pro-
gram was extended again as part of the Department of 
Defense Appropriation Act, 2010—P.L. 111-18.) 
In addition, ARRA provided for government pay-
ments of 65 percent of health insurance premiums 
for up to nine months of coverage under the Consoli-
dated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 
(COBRA) for individuals whose employment was 
involuntarily terminated between September 1, 
2008, and December 31, 2009.4 That program was 
expanded and extended by the Department of 
Defense Appropriation Act, 2010. Under current law, 
the duration of premium assistance is 15 months for 
workers who were involuntarily terminated from 
their job between September 1, 2008, and February 
28, 2010.
In addition, ARRA provided aid to state governments 
by temporarily increasing the federal share of Medic-
aid costs through the end of calendar year 2010. To 
minimize reductions in education and other public 
services provided by state governments, the act pro-
vided funds for grants to states for education and 
other purposes. ARRA provided increased funding for 
higher education, most of which was for Pell grants. 
The act also provided funding for a variety of other 
programs, including highway construction and other 
infrastructure projects, energy efficiency projects, 
housing, health information technology, health 
research, and other scientific research.
Worker, Homeownership, and Business 
Assistance Act of 2009 
Enacted on November 6, 2009, WHBAA 
(P.L. 111-92) expanded or extended three provisions 
that were scheduled to expire at the end of 2009: the 
extension and expansion of emergency unemployment 
compensation, the first-time homebuyer tax credit, 
and the carryback for net operating losses.
WHBAA provided unemployment benefits for an 
additional 14 weeks, and for 6 weeks more for those 
living in a state with an unemployment rate higher 
than 8.5 percent. The eligibility dates were extended 
by an amendment to the Department of Defense 
Appropriation Act, 2010. Currently, emergency 
unemployment compensation is available for as many 
as 53 additional weeks to people who exhaust their 
regular benefits by the end of February 2010. 
WHBAA also extended eligibility for the $8,000 
homebuyer credit to homes purchased or under con-
tract by April 30, 2010. In addition, it expanded the 
program to provide credits of up to $6,500 for home-
owners who have lived in their home for at least five 
years and who purchase a new home. 
WHBAA also extended and expanded the carryback 
provision in ARRA, allowing all businesses, regardless 
of size, to carry back losses incurred in 2008 and 2009 
for five years.
3.   The current emergency unemployment compensation pro-
gram was first enacted in July 2008 and was expanded and 
extended in November 2008 before being further expanded 
and extended by ARRA.
4. COBRA facilitates the continuation of group health insur-
ance for individuals who have lost their job. 
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The Outlook for a Slow Recovery 
In its most recent economic forecast, issued in August 
2009, CBO projected a modest turnaround in economic 
activity in the second half of that year.5 Contributing to 
that outlook were the growing fiscal stimulus from 
ARRA, improving conditions in financial markets, slower 
declines in residential and business investment, and a 
slower pace of inventory reductions. The economy now 
appears to have begun the anticipated recovery. Accord-
ing to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, real GDP rose at 
an annual rate of 2.2 percent in the third quarter of 2009, 
the first increase since the second quarter of 2008. Indus-
trial production grew at an average monthly rate of about 
0.7 percent between July and November. 
Deep recessions can be followed by steep recoveries, 
driven by firms’ decisions to stop liquidating inventories 
and to replace capital equipment when demand stops fall-
ing. However, several factors suggest that this recovery 
will be weaker than usual: Fiscal and monetary policy will 
not be providing the same boost to economic growth that 
they often have during the early stages of recoveries; 
financial and housing markets remain fragile; and con-
sumers may want to rebuild their savings after large losses 
in stock and housing wealth. In addition, improvements 
in employment will probably lag well behind growth in 
Box 2.
Future Tax Changes Under Current Law 
Under current law, the tax cuts provided by the Eco-
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001 (EGTRRA) and the Jobs and Growth Tax 
Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) are 
scheduled to expire at the end of 2010. Also expiring 
then are the Making Work Pay credit, enacted in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 
(ARRA, Public Law 111-5, see Box 1 on page 4), and 
certain other provisions. In addition, temporary relief 
for many households from the alternative minimum 
tax (AMT) expired at the end of 2009; most of the 
resulting increase in tax payments will occur in 2011 
because many taxpayers will be allowed to pay their 
2010 AMT liability in 2011.1
When the various provisions of EGTRRA and 
JGTRRA expire in 2011, income earned in the cur-
rent 10 percent tax bracket will be taxed instead at a 
rate of 15 percent; the reduced tax rates of 25, 28, 33, 
and 35 percent in the top four tax brackets will revert 
to 28, 31, 36, and 39.6 percent, respectively. In addi-
tion, the highest tax rate on capital gains and divi-
dends, currently 15 percent, will rise sharply. Capital 
gains will be taxed at a maximum of 20 percent; 
dividends will no longer have a special low tax rate 
but will be taxed at regular tax rates instead, so the 
top rate will be 39.6 percent. In recent years, the 
Congress has steadily increased the exemption 
amount for the AMT, but that amount falls from 
$46,700 (for individuals) and $70,950 (for couples) 
in the 2009 tax year to $33,750 and $45,000, respec-
tively, in 2010. Other expiring provisions include the 
temporary expansion in the child tax credit, the Hope 
credit for certain expenses for higher education, and 
the credit for first-time home buyers.
All told, the expiration of those provisions will 
increase tax revenue (and correspondingly decrease 
disposable personal income) by about $300 billion, 
or 2.7 percent, in 2011. The expiring provisions in 
EGTRRA and JGTRRA account for roughly half of 
that amount, the AMT change for about $60 billion, 
and the expiration of the Making Work Pay credit for 
roughly $50 billion. Other expiring provisions 
account for the remainder.2
1. The AMT is an alternative tax originally intended to impose 
taxes on high-income individuals who use tax preferences to 
greatly reduce or eliminate their liability under the regular 
income tax.
2. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic 
Outlook: An Update (August 2009), Box 2-2. 
5. See Congressional Budget Office, The Budget and Economic Out-
look: An Update (August 2009). CBO will issue a new forecast 
later this month.
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demand and production, in part because that growth is 
expected to be slow. 
Credit Markets
Even though credit markets have substantially improved 
since mid-2009, credit has remained tight for borrowers 
who have lower credit ratings. Several factors help explain 
the reluctance of banks to lend. After a period of signifi-
cant distrust of the health of their institutional counter-
parts, some banks are holding a larger amount of liquid 
assets than before. Loan losses remain high, with the per-
formance of bank loans continuing to deteriorate 
through the third quarter of 2009; that pattern makes 
banks cautious about taking more risks. The private secu-
ritization market for residential mortgages that was pro-
viding financing for borrowers with lower credit ratings is 
far from being restored, mainly because private investors 
lack confidence in that market. 
The foreclosure rate on houses remains high, and fore-
closures are spreading to parts of the housing market that 
previously were less affected. Foreclosure starts for prime 
fixed-rate mortgages, in particular, increased rapidly 
between early last year and the third quarter (the latest 
available data). Most economists expect foreclosures to 
rise further in 2010, which could have a negative impact 
on home prices and thus (because of the reduction in 
wealth) on consumer spending.
Consumer Spending
Large losses of wealth in the stock and housing markets, 
tight borrowing conditions, and weak income growth 
have held down consumer spending. Although the Stan-
dard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 stock market index is up by 
more than 50 percent since its low point in March 2009, 
it is still about 30 percent below its high point in October 
2007. Average house prices have also turned back up: The 
Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA) Index (derived 
from data on conforming mortgages obtained from Fan-
nie Mae and Freddie Mac) has stabilized since the begin-
ning of 2009, and the S&P/Case-Shiller Index (derived 
from data on conforming and nonconforming mortgages 
obtained from county assessors and recorders) rose at an 
annual rate of almost 8 percent during both the second 
and third quarters of 2009.6 In the third quarter, how-
ever, those indexes were still about 10 percent (FHFA) 
and 30 percent (S&P/Case-Shiller) below their peak val-
ues reached in 2007 and 2006, respectively. Those losses 
of wealth encourage households to increase their saving 
and rebuild their wealth; in addition, the reduction in 
housing equity reduces the opportunities of some house-
holds to borrow money to facilitate spending. 
Saving might also be boosted by consumers who view the 
losses in wealth and jobs in the past few years as signaling 
a riskier economic environment than they had previously 
expected and therefore decide to do more precautionary 
saving. The personal saving rate has increased from about 
2.0 percent of disposable income in 2007 to 4.5 percent 
in the third quarter of 2009. Combined with slow growth 
in disposable income, the rise in saving has sharply 
reduced consumption spending below its previous trend. 
At the end of 2009, real consumption spending was still 
1.2 percent below what it had been at the end of 2007, 
when the recession began; had real consumption spend-
ing instead continued to increase at its average growth 
rate during the preceding six years, it would have grown 
cumulatively by about 6.0 percent from 2007 to 2009. 
Employment and Unemployment
Although output began to rebound during the second 
half of 2009, the unemployment rate continued to rise, 
reaching 10.0 percent in December, and payroll employ-
ment has not yet shown significant growth. (For the 
effects of the recession on unemployment, see Box 3.) 
Conditions in the labor market deteriorated less rapidly 
during the second half of 2009 than in the preceding year 
and a half, but a sustained turnaround in the unemploy-
ment rate and a recovery in employment are clearly lag-
ging behind the recovery in production and output. New 
claims for unemployment insurance have fallen substan-
tially since early 2009, but they remain well above prere-
cession levels. At the same time, hiring rates are still very 
low, with only weak signals pointing to imminent 
improvement. 
That pattern is typical of recent recessions, in which the 
unemployment rate continued to rise and employment 
continued to fall for 6 to 12 months after real GDP 
began to grow. Hiring usually lags behind output during 
the initial stages of a recovery because firms tend to 
increase output first by boosting productivity and by rais-
ing the number of hours existing employees work; adding 
to payrolls tends to occur somewhat later. Indeed, pro-
ductivity in the nonfarm business sector surged at an 
6. Conforming mortgages are loans that have a dollar amount below 
the limit that Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are allowed to pur-
chase and terms and conditions that meet the funding criteria of 
Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. 
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Box 3.
Effects of the Recession on Unemployment
The unemployment rate has risen almost continu-
ously since December 2007. It climbed to 10.1 per-
cent in October 2009 and stood at 10.0 percent in 
December 2009. At the beginning of the recession, 
only 4 states had an unemployment rate at 6 percent 
or above. In November 2009, that number increased 
to 48; in 15 states the rate was above 10 percent, and 
the highest rate was 14.7 percent (see the figure on 
the right). 
In the recent recession, those who have been hit espe-
cially hard include men, younger workers, and less 
educated workers. The unemployment rate for men 
age 20 or older rose from 4 percent in the fourth 
quarter of 2007 to 10 percent in the fourth quarter 
of 2009; the rate for women, also 4 percent in late 
2007, rose less—to 8 percent. Unemployment among 
workers between ages 20 and 24 rose from 9 percent 
in late 2007 to 16 percent in the fourth quarter 
of 2009. During the same period, the unemploy-
ment rate for workers age 25 or older who had less 
than a high school diploma rose from 8 percent to 
15 percent. 
The long duration of this recession has sharply 
increased the number of discouraged and part-time 
workers. An alternative measure of unemployment 
that accounts for “marginally attached” workers (peo-
ple who say they have given up looking for work) and 
for part-time workers who would prefer full-time 
employment rose from 9 percent in December 2007 
to 17 percent in December 2009.1
Distribution of States, by State 
Unemployment Rates
(Number of states)
Source: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Labor, 
Bureau of Labor Statistics.
The recession has also had dramatic effects on the 
flows of workers through the job market. In an aver-
age month in 2007, about 5.3 million people were 
hired and 5.2 million people left their jobs (separa-
tions by quitting, retiring, being fired, or changing 
jobs). The net effect of those huge flows was an 
increase in employment each month of about 
100,000. By the third quarter of 2009, the average 
monthly number of hires and separations had fallen 
to 4.1 million and about 4.3 million, respectively; 
those smaller but still very large flows resulted in a net 
decline in employment that averaged about 240,000 
each month. Separations declined despite an increase 
in layoffs and discharges because the number of 
people quitting their jobs declined dramatically. 
1. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table A-12, 
Alternative Measures of Labor Underutilization, measure 
U-6. The data are available from 1994. Marginally attached 
workers are individuals who currently are not working and 
are not looking for work but indicate that they want and are 
available for a job and have looked for work sometime in the 
recent past. Individuals employed part time for economic 
reasons are those who want and are available for full-time 
work but have had to settle for a part-time schedule. 
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Figure 2.
Average Weekly Hours Worked in 
Private Industries
(Hours)
Source: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics.
Notes: Data are quarterly and are plotted through the fourth quarter 
of 2009.
The shaded bars indicate the duration of recessions. The 
National Bureau of Economic Research establishes the dates 
on which recessions begin and end but has not yet done so 
for the end of the most recent recession, which is shown as 
having ended in the second quarter of 2009.
annual rate of about 7½ percent during the second and 
third quarters and appears to have grown rapidly in the 
fourth quarter as well. Moreover, the unemployment rate 
generally lags further behind the turning point in output 
because the number of people seeking work early in a 
recovery tends to rebound faster than employment. Like 
the consensus in the most recent Blue Chip survey (com-
prising about 50 private-sector forecasts), CBO envisions 
only a gradual recovery in employment and other mea-
sures of the labor market. Several factors are important to 
this outlook. 
First, and most important, output is expected to grow 
fairly slowly. Following the two previous most severe 
recessions in the postwar period—1973–1975 and 
1981–1982—employment recovered much more rapidly 
than CBO and others currently expect. But those recover-
ies featured much faster growth in output than is now 
anticipated, with real GDP growing by 6.2 percent in the 
four quarters following the 1973–1975 recession and by 
7.8 percent in the same period following the 1981–1982 
recession. In contrast, employment changed little during 
the four quarters following the 1990–1991 recession, 
when real GDP rose by 2.6 percent; and employment fell 
by more than one million in the six quarters following the 
2001 recession, when real GDP grew at an average 
annual rate of 2.1 percent. In CBO’s August update, real 
GDP was projected to increase by an average annual rate 
of a little more than 3 percent from the fourth quarter of 
2009 to the fourth quarter of 2011. 
Second, average weekly hours worked in private indus-
tries fell sharply during the recession to a level well below 
their long-term downward trend (see Figure 2). Restoring 
hours of existing employees is one way that employers can 
increase labor input without having to bear the fixed costs 
of hiring new workers. Although average weekly hours 
worked increased in late 2009, they remain below the 
long-term trend, suggesting that many firms will increase 
workers’ hours before doing new hiring on a large scale. 
Third, the movement of unemployed workers into new 
jobs will probably be more difficult in this recovery than 
in past ones. Recessions often accelerate the demise or 
shrinkage of less efficient and less profitable firms, espe-
cially those in declining industries and sectors. Thus, the 
share of unemployed workers whose previous job is per-
manently lost tends to rise during recessions; the rise has 
been especially pronounced during the past two years (see 
Figure 3). At the same time, workers on temporary layoff 
represent a smaller percentage of the unemployed than 
they did in past recessions.
As a result, gains in employment after this recession will 
probably rely more than usual on the creation of new 
jobs, possibly in new firms that are located in different 
places and require workers with different skills than those 
needed in the jobs that have disappeared. For workers 
who have lost jobs because of a permanent layoff, the pro-
cess of acquiring new skills can take time. (In contrast, it 
is easier for workers who have been laid off temporarily to 
return to their jobs because the employers already know 
the workers and the workers already have the right skills 
and are familiar with the work practices at the job.) For 
workers who need to move to different geographic 
regions to find new jobs, the sharp declines in home 
prices during this recession, combined with the high 
loan-to-value ratios on many mortgages before the down-
turn, will hinder relocation. With a significant share of 
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Figure 3.
People Who Have Lost Jobs as a 
Percentage of the Unemployed
(Percent)
Source: Congressional Budget Office; Department of Labor, Bureau 
of Labor Statistics. 
Notes: Data are monthly and are plotted through December 2009.
The shaded bars indicate the duration of recessions. The 
National Bureau of Economic Research establishes the dates 
on which recessions begin and end but has not yet done so 
for the end of the most recent recession, which is shown as 
having ended in the second quarter of 2009.
The data do not add up to 100 percent of the unemployed 
because that group also includes people who quit their job, 
entered the labor force for the first time, or returned to the 
labor force after some period of absence. 
homeowners now owing more on their mortgages than 
their homes are worth, many people may not be able to 
sell their house for enough money to enable them to buy 
one in a new area. 
Finally, the labor force is expected to grow at a faster-
than-normal rate, which will slow the pace of decline in 
the unemployment rate. During the recession, many 
workers were discouraged from looking for a job; when 
they stopped actively seeking work, they were no longer 
counted as part of the labor force. When they again 
actively seek work, they will be counted among the 
unemployed. Following the pattern of past recessions, 
those workers will probably return to the labor force as 
economic conditions improve, partially offsetting the 
improving conditions and slowing the decrease in the 
unemployment rate. 
Although all of those factors suggest that the pace of the 
recovery in employment is likely to be slow during the 
next few years, several indicators hint that hiring condi-
tions may improve in the near future. Employment in 
temporary help services, a leading indicator for the labor 
market, experienced large gains in late 2009. Moreover, as 
GDP growth resumed in midyear, the increase in output 
was achieved by increased productivity rather than 
increased employment. Although such a surge in produc-
tivity is quite typical around the end of a recession and in 
the early stage of a recovery, in the past such surges have 
not lasted more than a few quarters. Consequently, the 
pace of productivity growth will probably slow signifi-
cantly in 2010, and as long as economic activity contin-
ues to grow at even a modest pace, some new hiring can 
be anticipated. 
Economists generally count recoveries in output or 
employment from the point at which their growth rates 
turn positive. Such a turning point, however, is only the 
beginning of a recovery. After a recession, output and 
employment must grow at above-trend rates to catch up 
to the levels they would have reached in the absence of 
the recession. For a recession as deep as the most recent 
one, that process will probably take a number of years.
Principles for Increasing Economic 
Growth and Employment in 2010 and 
2011
Even without any additional policy action, market 
forces—acting in concert with monetary and fiscal policy 
actions that have already been taken but whose effects 
have not yet been fully felt—would bring the economy 
back to potential output and full use of resources in sev-
eral years. In the meantime, however, many workers 
would remain or would become unemployed, and much 
capacity of equipment and buildings would be unused. 
Idle workers and factories represent a waste of the econ-
omy’s ability to produce goods and services, and that pro-
duction cannot be made up later. Additional policy 
actions, if well designed, could hasten the economy’s 
recovery and reduce the loss of output and raise employ-
ment during the next few years. However, designing an 
effective policy is challenging, and policies that provide 
economic benefits during the next few years may impose 
economic costs over the longer run.
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In normal economic times, economists tend to emphasize 
the long-term benefits of saving relative to spending. The 
more that households, firms, and governments save, the 
more that can be invested in productive capital, increas-
ing the economy’s capacity to produce in the future. 
When existing capital and labor resources are unused, 
however, increased private and public spending would 
employ those resources and raise the economy’s current 
production.7 Fiscal policies that promote long-term eco-
nomic growth may have little short-term effect on spend-
ing, especially if they take a long time to implement. Yet, 
policies that boost demand for goods and services in the 
short term tend to increase budget deficits and govern-
ment debt, which reduces capital and thus slows eco-
nomic growth in the long term. 
Economists generally recommend that fiscal policy 
intended to boost demand in the short term be timely—
providing help when it is needed most; cost-effective—
providing the most additional output and employment 
per dollar cost to the federal budget; and consistent with 
long-run fiscal objectives—preventing the short-term 
deficit increase that results from stimulative policy, which 
adds excessively to federal debt in the long run.8 Other 
considerations include uncertainty about a policy’s effec-
tiveness, the distribution of benefits among different peo-
ple, and the value of additional goods and services that 
would be produced. 
Timing
Policies differ greatly in how quickly they can be imple-
mented, and some measures might take effect too slowly, 
in two respects. First, they might miss the period of great-
est need in terms of both unemployment and unused 
capacity. Second, they might persist while the amount of 
unemployment and excess capacity drops into a range 
where the risk of pushing up inflation could be more sig-
nificant.
Current law implies significant fiscal restraint in 2010 
and 2011 as a result of declining stimulus from ARRA, 
the scheduled expiration of the tax cuts in EGGTRA and 
JGTRRA, and the increase in the exemption amounts for 
the AMT. Because of that restraint and the other factors 
cited above that make a slow recovery likely, CBO proj-
ects that the unemployment rate will not drop below 
8 percent until 2012; even at that level, it will be about 
three percentage points above CBO’s estimate of the rate 
that can be reached in good times without causing infla-
tion. That projection is, however, quite uncertain, and 
the recovery could prove to be much stronger or weaker 
than expected. Additional actions to promote growth in 
output and jobs could offset some of the expected factors 
slowing growth and provide some insurance against 
downside risks. 
Fiscal actions to promote growth run some risk of raising 
inflationary pressures, but that risk seems low over the 
next two years. Inflation is currently very low: CBO 
expects that the core price index for personal consump-
tion expenditures (that is, excluding the prices of food 
and energy) and the price index for personal consump-
tion expenditures increased less than 2 percent and less 
than half of a percent, respectively, in 2009. More impor-
tant, given the substantial slack that currently exists in the 
use of capital and labor, and the expectation of a slow ini-
tial recovery, CBO expects that low inflation will persist 
for some time; there is even a risk of deflation.
Thus, additional policy actions that had their greatest 
impact during the next few years would affect the econ-
omy when its output will probably be well below its 
potential, the risk of greater weakness remains elevated, 
and the risk of excessive inflation appears to be low. In 
2012 and beyond, however, the economy is expected to 
grow more strongly. Consequently, stimulus measures 
that lasted for a sustained period or became permanent 
could risk raising inflation in the later stages of the 
recovery. 
Furthermore, CBO’s expectation of a slow recovery in 
economic activity and persistent low inflation may turn 
out to be wrong. Even though the majority of forecasters 
expect a slow return to normal economic conditions, the 
uncertainty surrounding the economic outlook remains 
great. Large disturbances that produce sharp recessions 
7. One channel through which fiscal policies may spur spending is 
by reducing uncertainty. After a recession, many firms may remain 
uncertain about the prospect of recovery and may be cautious 
about increasing their investment and hiring until solid and per-
sistent signs of recovery appear. Policy actions that boost demand 
might help dissipate that uncertainty and increase employment. 
See Nicholas Bloom, “The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks,” 
Econometrica, vol. 77, no. 3 (May, 2009), pp. 623–685.
8. Congressional Budget Office, Options for Responding to Short-Term 
Economic Weakness (January 2008); and Congressional Budget 
Office, State of the Economy and Issues in Developing an Effective 
Policy Response, testimony by Douglas W. Elmendorf, Director, 
before the House Committee on the Budget (January 27, 2009). 
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are sometimes followed by rapid recoveries.9 For example, 
following the deep recession of 1981–1982, real GDP 
grew at an average annual rate of 7.8 percent between the 
first quarter of 1983 and the second quarter of 1984. Per-
haps economic forecasters are placing too much weight in 
their current forecasts on the poor economic performance 
of the past few years and not enough weight on the natu-
ral resilience of the U.S. economy. Moreover, even if eco-
nomic activity recovers only slowly, inflation might 
increase more quickly.
Those concerns do not mean that inflation will necessar-
ily rise: The Federal Reserve appears to have enough tools 
at its disposal to keep prices stable despite the tremen-
dous amount of liquidity provided during the past couple 
of years. However, in using those tools, the Federal 
Reserve is likely to counteract efforts by fiscal policy to 
promote growth if it viewed those efforts as raising the 
risk of significantly higher inflation (see Box 4). Thus, 
fiscal policies that increase demand for goods and services 
too slowly would have their largest effects at a time when 
the need is less acute and when the Federal Reserve is 
more likely to take actions that diminish those effects.
One possible solution to the timing problem is to build 
“triggers” into new measures. A program could have an 
expiration date tied to some macroeconomic statistics; for 
example, whether a payroll tax reduction would continue 
in effect could depend on whether the unemployment 
rate was below a certain level.
Cost-Effectiveness 
Aside from differences in the speed of implementation, 
possible policy measures also differ in the magnitude of 
their effects—that is, how much they boost spending by 
households, businesses, and governments per dollar of 
budgetary cost (federal spending or tax reductions). 
Cost-effectiveness can be assessed by the cumulative 
dollar effect on output and employment per dollar of 
budgetary cost.
Households. Tax cuts and government transfers to indi-
viduals increase households’ disposable income. The cost-
effectiveness of such policies depends on the fraction of 
the additional income that is spent on purchasing goods 
and services. Measures targeting households facing finan-
cial problems, such as those who have low income or 
unemployed members, tend to have larger impacts on 
spending and thus are more cost-effective. By contrast, 
measures that are less well targeted, such as across-the-
board reductions in income tax rates or broad tax rebates, 
would provide large parts of their relief to people who are 
not financially constrained. Such people are likely to save 
much of a tax reduction, especially if it is temporary. In 
that case, the policy would be much less cost-effective.
Businesses. Some policies seek to encourage business 
spending by providing incentives for new investment, 
such as allowing firms to “expense” their investment costs 
for tax purposes—that is, to deduct the cost of an invest-
ment in the year it is made. Those policies increase firms’ 
after-tax return on investment by reducing the present 
value of taxes, and they increase firms’ cash flow for the 
year in which the new investment is made. The success of 
such incentives in encouraging spending depends on the 
economic conditions when the incentives are in effect: A 
reduction in the cost of capital will generally not cause a 
business to buy new machinery if demand for the busi-
ness’s output is so low that the machinery would stand 
idle. Several studies suggest that the impact of being able 
to expense investment costs in the early 2000s, when 
demand was depressed (though not nearly as weak as it is 
now), was modest.10
Other policies encourage hiring by temporarily or perma-
nently reducing the cost of labor. The cost-effectiveness 
of those policies depends on firms’ responses to the tax 
benefits received: whether they pass the benefits to cus-
tomers in the form of lower prices, to employees in the 
form of higher wages, or implicitly to shareholders by 
retaining them as profits—and the extent to which they 
increase employment and hours during a period when it 
is temporarily less expensive. 
Government. The federal government can boost demand 
by increasing its own purchases of goods and services or 
by providing funds to state and local governments to 
increase their purchases of goods and services. How fast 
significant sums of money could be wisely spent, how-
ever, is unclear. In general, large increases in funding tend 
to be spent more slowly. Also, many public infrastructure 
9. Nicholas Bloom, Steven Bond, and John Van Reenen, “Uncer-
tainty and Investment Dynamics,” Review of Economic Studies 
(2007), pp. 391-415.
10. For a summary of the literature on the effects of partial expensing 
and bonus depreciation in the early 2000s, see Congressional 
Budget Office, Options for Responding to Short-Term Economic 
Weakness.
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projects, which require coordination among different lev-
els of government, take a long time to implement. Such 
projects can be cost-effective in terms of the number of 
jobs generated per dollar of budgetary cost because they 
involve direct purchases of goods and the hiring of work-
ers, but only a small share of the full effect is likely to be 
felt in the first two years after a proposal becomes law.
Federal grants to state and local governments can contrib-
ute to national economic growth—and aid people in the 
jurisdictions that receive the funds—by reducing the 
need for those governments to cut spending or raise taxes 
to narrow their budget shortfalls. Analysts expect those 
shortfalls to be very large in the next few years. For fiscal 
year 2010, 18 states are projected to have budget gaps 
(projected revenue shortfalls as a percentage of general 
fund expenditures) that exceed 20 percent, and 3 have 
gaps exceeding 40 percent (see Figure 4).11 Aid would be 
less effective in increasing employment if it simply 
allowed jurisdictions to borrow less. However, in the cur-
rent economic environment, most states have already 
borrowed as much as they can under their own budget 
rules and will probably remain up against those limits 
during the next few years. 
Consistency with Long-Run Fiscal Objectives
Spending increases and tax cuts raise budget deficits in 
the short term. Because government debt tends to “crowd 
out” capital, higher deficits, if persistent, slow economic 
growth in the long term. Given the large projected fiscal 
imbalance in the medium and long run under current 
laws and policies, new fiscal actions best meet the nation’s 
long-run fiscal needs if they avoid enlarging the long-
term fiscal gap.12 To achieve that goal, near-term increases 
in government spending or reductions in taxes would 
need to be followed by offsetting reductions in spending 
or increases in taxes after the economy recovers. 
The federal government recorded a total budget deficit
of $1.4 trillion in fiscal year 2009. That amount equaled 
10 percent of GDP—the largest shortfall relative to the 
size of the economy since 1945. Outlays increased by 
nearly $540 billion in 2009, and about 65 percent of that 
growth was associated with the efforts to rescue financial 
markets and support the economy. Federal deficits are 
expected to remain high in fiscal years 2010 and 2011, 
and the debt held by the public is likely to continue to 
rise as a percentage of GDP. In its August budget outlook 
report, CBO projected that federal debt held by the pub-
lic would reach 66 percent of GDP by the end of fiscal 
year 2012, up from 37 percent at the end of 2007. If cur-
rent policies and laws are kept in place, the debt held by 
the public will continue to accumulate rapidly after 2012; 
coupled with rising interest rates as recovery progresses, 
net interest payments will roughly triple (relative to the 
size of the economy) over the next 10 years, according to 
CBO’s August 2009 projections. If new stimulative mea-
sures are adopted but are not accompanied by offsetting 
fiscal policy to reduce deficits later, the negative impact of 
budget deficits will be even greater. 
Other Considerations
Other considerations also are relevant for decisions about 
new policies to promote economic growth and employ-
ment. One involves determining who would be helped 
the most by the new policies. In addition to the potential 
overall effect of higher demand, different sorts of spend-
ing increases and tax reductions would provide direct 
benefits to different people and firms. Such distributional 
considerations may play an important role in policymak-
ing, although the distributional effects of alternative poli-
cies are not analyzed in this paper.
Another consideration involves the types of additional 
goods and services that society would produce and from 
which it would enjoy benefits. When designing govern-
ment spending programs, it clearly makes more sense to 
accomplish something intrinsically desirable. Paraphras-
ing the economist John Maynard Keynes, hiring unem-
ployed workers to dig holes and then fill them up would 
generate jobs and provide income to people currently 
unemployed; however, it would not generate a useful 
11. Calculation based on data from Pew Center for the States, 
Beyond California, States in Fiscal Peril (Washington, D.C.: 
Pew Charitable Trusts, November 2009).
12. Congressional Budget Office, The Long-Term Budget Outlook 
(June 2009).
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Continued
Box 4.
CBO’s Modeling Approach
The analysis of each policy option presented in this 
paper focuses on how it affects output and employ-
ment. For each option, the Congressional Budget 
Office (CBO) used evidence from empirical studies 
and econometric models to estimate the impact on:
B Output—the cumulative effects on gross domestic 
product (GDP) per dollar of total budgetary cost 
(additional government spending or reduction in 
taxes), and 
B Employment—the cumulative effects on years of 
full-time-equivalent employment (FTE-years) per 
million dollars of total budgetary cost. 
The approach adopted to measure a policy’s effect on 
output is similar to the method CBO previously used 
to assess the effect of the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act (ARRA, Public Law 111-5).1 
Estimated impacts include the direct and indirect 
effects on the nation’s output of a dollar’s worth of a 
given policy. Direct effects consist of immediate (or 
first-round) effects on economic activity. For exam-
ple, government purchases of goods and services 
directly elicit economic activity and thereby have a 
direct dollar-for-dollar impact on output. Indirect 
effects are the second-round effects, which may 
enhance or offset the direct effects. For example, if 
the economy has idle resources, as it does now, gov-
ernment funding for projects can lead to the hiring of 
otherwise unemployed workers. The additional 
spending by those workers, who now would have 
more income, would constitute a positive indirect 
effect. In contrast, a substantial increase in govern-
ment spending tends to drive up interest rates, which 
discourages spending on investment and on durable 
goods by raising the cost of borrowed funds. Those 
indirect crowding-out effects would offset some of 
the direct effect. Low and high estimates of multipli-
ers for a given policy were chosen, on a judgmental 
basis, to encompass most economists’ views about the 
effects of that type of policy. 
To assess a policy’s impact on employment, CBO 
used a series of steps to translate the estimated effects 
on output into estimated effects on FTE-years. First, 
CBO calculated the impact on the output gap—the 
percentage difference between actual output and 
potential output (the amount that the economy is 
capable of producing given its labor supply, capital 
stock, and technology). Next, CBO calculated the 
magnitude and timing of effects of changes in the 
output gap on productivity, hours per worker, and 
the unemployment rate using the historical relation-
ships between the measures. Changes in the output 
gap initially have the largest effects on productivity; 
they affect hours per worker and unemployment 
gradually over several quarters. CBO also took 
account of the effect of changes in the unemploy-
ment rate on the labor force, since discouraged work-
ers and people who have chosen to pursue activities 
such as schooling rather than work tend to return to 
the labor force when unemployment declines and the 
economic environment improves. 
For policy options that would reduce labor costs and 
provide direct incentives for increasing employment 
and hours worked, CBO also accounted for firms’ 
possible reactions, which would probably take several 
forms. Some firms would use additional labor to 
enhance the quality of products and services in ways 
not reflected in GDP. Some would use additional 
labor to increase maintenance of existing plants and 
equipment (such as doing preventive maintenance 
work on motor vehicles), which would make plants 
and equipment last longer and delay the need to 
invest in replacements. Depending on the type of 
products they made, some firms would also increase 
their use of labor that was temporarily less expensive 
while the policy was in effect and reduce their use of 
labor later. Last, some firms would hire a little sooner 
to cover anticipated increases in their labor needs.
1. For the methodology to assess the economic effects of ARRA 
and the range of multipliers used for each policy category, 
see Congressional Budget Office, Estimated Impact of the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act on Employment and 
Economic Output as of September 2009 (November 2009). 
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Box 4. Continued
CBO’s Modeling Approach
Measuring employment impacts in FTE-years, 
defined as 40 hours of employment per week for one 
year, incorporated the effects of policies on hours 
worked in addition to their impact on the number of 
people who would be employed. Increases in the 
number of employed people at a point in time, as 
estimated for ARRA, do not include shifts from part-
time to full-time work or overtime and are generally 
somewhat smaller than increases in FTE-years.
Monetary policy is also modeled somewhat differ-
ently in this analysis than in CBO’s earlier analyses of 
the impact of ARRA. When estimating ARRA’s 
effects, CBO assumed that the Federal Reserve would 
not reduce the amount of stimulus it was providing 
with its own policy levers (such as low interest rates 
and its efforts to increase liquidity by other means) to 
offset the output growth caused by ARRA. That 
assumption rested on the assessment that the eco-
nomic outlook was sufficiently worrisome that the 
Federal Reserve was trying to provide a great deal of 
stimulus and would have welcomed additional stimu-
lus from fiscal policy. When analyzing fiscal policy 
actions in this paper, however, CBO assumed that as 
the recovery progressed, the Federal Reserve would 
see less need to provide monetary stimulus. Under 
CBO’s macroeconomic forecast, that assumption 
implies that at the end of 2011 the Federal Reserve 
would gradually begin to offset fiscal policy actions 
by raising interest rates (or engaging in other actions 
to tighten monetary policy) in order to reduce the 
risk of excessive inflation. As a result, a fiscal policy 
action that had an initially positive impact on output 
in 2010 or 2011 would have a smaller negative effect 
later. Applying that methodology to ARRA implies 
that ARRA will have a small negative effect in 
2013, because the positive effect of additional spend-
ing occurring in that year is slightly outweighed
Estimated Effects of ARRA on Real GDP
(Billions of dollars)
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
by the negative effect of tighter monetary policy 
stemming from the boost to output in 2012 (see the 
figure).
Another difference between this analysis and the 
analysis done for ARRA is that, instead of reporting a 
policy’s multiplier or impact at a point in time, this 
analysis focuses on cumulative changes over specific 
time periods. Effects on output were measured as the 
cumulative effects between 2010 and 2015. Effects 
on employment (in terms of FTE-years for each cal-
endar quarter) were added together to estimate 
cumulative effects over three time periods: 2010, 
2010 and 2011, and 2010 through 2015. Because 
reactions of the Federal Reserve are anticipated to 
begin by the end of 2011, the effects of some policies 
on output and employment in some periods after 
2011 were estimated to be negative. As a result, for 
some policies the cumulative effects in FTE-years 
from 2010 to 2015 are smaller than the effect in 
2010 and 2011.
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Figure 4.
State Budget Gaps, Fiscal Year 2010
Source: Congressional Budget Office based on data from Pew Center for the States, Beyond California: States in Fiscal Peril (Washington, 
D.C.: Pew Charitable Trusts, November 2009).
Note: A state’s budget gap is the difference between its expenditures and revenues expressed as a percentage of the general fund
expenditures for that state.
product for society. Fiscal policies can be judged not only 
on their contribution to growth and job creation but also 
on the extent to which they accomplish other goals. 
A third consideration involves the combination of poli-
cies that might be chosen. Most economists agree that fis-
cal policies can boost demand and help smooth business 
cycles, at least in the short run. However, some econo-
mists are skeptical about the efficacy of such policies and 
the magnitude of their effects. One benefit of a diversi-
fied portfolio of policies is that the overall effect of policy 
on the economy would be less uncertain than with a
single policy. Moreover, the benefits of such a portfolio of 
policies might spread more widely among different 
groups in the population and thus accomplish a larger 
variety of goals. 
Assessing Policy Options for 
Increasing Economic Growth and 
Employment
CBO has assessed the potential of a variety of fiscal policy 
options for promoting economic growth and increasing 
employment. Some options are similar to measures
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included in H.R. 2847, which was passed by the House 
of Representatives on December 16, 2009.13
The different policy options would work somewhat dif-
ferently depending on whether they seek to support 
spending by households, businesses, or governments. Pol-
icy options aimed at assisting households would spur 
demand for goods and services to varying degrees and 
thereby boost production to varying degrees. Because 
businesses’ decisions on investing and hiring depend on 
the demand for their products, higher demand and pro-
duction would lead to more investment and hiring. The 
size of those effects would depend largely on which 
households got the money. Policies that would temporar-
ily increase the after-tax income of people who are rela-
tively well off would probably have little effect on their 
spending because they would be able to consume out of 
their income or assets. However, policies that increased 
the resources of families with lower income, few assets, 
and poor credit would probably have a larger impact on 
consumption spending. Because of the extent of job 
losses and declines in asset prices in this recession, more 
families probably fit those descriptions now than was the 
case in the immediate aftermath of many previous reces-
sions. Policy options that support businesses would oper-
ate somewhat differently. Certain policies would reduce 
labor costs or the cost of investment, which would spur 
hiring and investment and in turn increase production 
and household income. The rise in income would sup-
port consumer demand and increase production by other 
firms. Additional government spending would also boost 
output and employment, both directly through the gov-
ernment-funded activity and indirectly through increases 
in consumer demand for goods and services resulting 
from higher income of the households and firms that 
directly benefit from the government activity. 
CBO assessed the effects of various policy options on out-
put and employment (see Table 1). To make that assess-
ment, the agency used an approach that builds on the one 
it previously used to assess the economic impact of ARRA 
(for details of the methodology, see Box 4 on page 14). 
The effect of a policy on output is measured by the 
cumulative effects on GDP for each dollar of total bud-
getary cost (that cost equals the additional federal spend-
ing or reduction in federal tax revenue). The effect of a 
policy on employment is measured by the cumulative 
effects on years of full-time-equivalent employment for 
each dollar of total budgetary cost (a year of full-time-
equivalent employment is 40 hours of employment per 
week for one year). By focusing on full-time equivalents, 
the calculations include increases in hours among people 
in part-time employment and possibly some overtime for 
full-time employees. To account for uncertainty, the anal-
ysis includes both a “low” estimate and a “high” estimate 
for the effect of each policy. The results cover the effects 
of policies between 2010 and 2015 but give particular 
prominence to the effects that will occur in 2010 and 
2011, when CBO expects that the economy will still be 
in the early stages of the recovery. The estimates include 
the effect of the Federal Reserve gradually beginning to 
offset fiscal policy actions at the end of 2011 in order to 
avoid increasing the risk of inflation; as a result, some 
policies would generate cumulative effects on employ-
ment that are lower for 2010 through 2015 than for 2010 
through 2011.
For this analysis, policies were assumed to be temporary 
(that is, to be in effect for specific time periods or for spe-
cific dollar amounts), although some of the policies could 
also be designed to be permanent. The total effect of a 
policy on economic growth and employment would 
depend critically on the magnitude of the reduction in 
taxes or increase in spending that would occur. The larg-
est feasible magnitude of the budgetary change varies 
across policies, but all of the options considered are suffi-
ciently scalable to allow tens of billions of dollars of 
spending increases or tax cuts in 2010 and 2011. 
Policy Options with a Substantial Proportion of 
Impacts Beginning in 2010
Among the policy options considered here, those that 
were estimated to have a substantial proportion of their 
impacts beginning in 2010 are increasing aid to the 
13. H.R. 2847 would extend the date to qualify for additional weeks 
of unemployment benefits to June 2010, extend the duration of 
assistance with paying the health insurance premiums of individu-
als who lose jobs by the end of June 2010, remove the earned 
income requirement for the child tax credit in 2010, authorize 
more funding for infrastructure and other spending programs, 
and provide additional aid to states. CBO and the staff of the 
Joint Committee on Taxation estimate that the budgetary cost of 
H.R. 2847 will be about $185 billion during the 2010–2019 
period, comprising an increase in spending of about $181 billion 
and a decrease in revenue of about $4 billion. 
18 POLICIES FOR INCREASING ECONOMIC GROWTH AND EMPLOYMENT IN 2010 AND 2011
CBO
Table 1.
Estimated Effects of Policy Options on Output and Employment
Source: Congressional Budget Office.
Notes:  Additional details on each policy option are provided on pages 19–26 of the text. 
In estimates of the effects on output and employment, the total budgetary cost is the amount of tax revenue or budget authority over 
the full duration of the policies’ effects unless otherwise specified. 
All years are calendar years.
The ranges between low and high estimates are designed to encompass most economists’ views. 
Unless otherwise specified, spending policy options are assumed to provide budget authority as of April 2010, and tax policy options 
are assumed to be in effect for 2010 only.
* = between zero and 0.5.
a. Estimated as gross domestic product (GDP) with a policy minus GDP without the policy.
b. Estimated as years of full-time-equivalent employment (FTE-years) with a policy minus FTE-years without the policy. An FTE-year is 
40 hours of employment per week for one year. For example, four people working 20 hours per week for six months equals one FTE-year.
c. Spending begins in March 2010, and no benefit payments are made after July 2011.
d. Initial reductions in revenues are nearly fully offset by later increases. The policy’s effects are therefore estimated per dollar of the pres-
ent discounted value of the policy (discounted at the businesses’ cost of debt and equity) instead of per dollar of total budgetary cost.
e. Timing of spending from new funding follows historical experience.
f. Includes the effects of extending higher exemption amounts for the alternative minimum tax in 2010.
Increasing Aid to the Unemployedc 0.70 1.90 4 7 8 19 6 15
Reducing Employers' Payroll Taxes 0.40 1.20 3 5 5 13 4 11
Reducing Employers' Payroll Taxes for Firms 
That Increase Their Payroll 0.40 1.30 5 9 8 18 7 16
Reducing Employees' Payroll Taxes 0.30 0.90 2 4 3 9 2 7
Providing an Additional One-Time
Social Security Payment 0.30 0.90 2 6 3 9 2 8
Allowing Full or Partial Expensing of
 Investment Costsd 0.20 1.00 1 3 2 9 1 8
Investing in Infrastructuree 0.50 1.20 * 1 2 4 4 10
Providing Aid to States for Purposes Other
Than Infrastructuree 0.40 1.10 1 1 3 7 3 9
Providing Additional Refundable Tax Credits for
Lower- and Middle-Income 0.30 0.90 * * 3 6 3 7
Households in 2011
Extending Higher Exemption Amounts for the
Alternative Minimum Tax 0.10 0.40 * * 1 4 1 4
Reducing Income Taxes in 2011f 0.10 0.40 * * 1 3 1 4
 total budgetary cost)
High Low High
per million dollars of total budgetary cost)
2010–20152010 2010–2011
Beginning in 2011
Beginning in 2010
GDP,  2010–2015a  
Cumulative Effects on Employment bCumulative Effects on 
(Years of full-time-equivalent employment 
Policy Options with a Substantial Proportion of Impacts 
Policy Options with a Substantial Proportion of Impacts 
(Dollars per dollar of
Low High Low High Low
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unemployed, reducing employers’ payroll taxes, reducing 
payroll taxes for firms that increase their payroll, reducing 
employees’ payroll taxes, providing an additional one-
time Social Security payment, and allowing full or partial 
expensing of investment costs.
Increasing Aid to the Unemployed. Under current law, 
some people who exhaust their unemployment benefits 
by the end of February 2010 will be eligible for additional 
weeks of benefits through emergency unemployment 
compensation (see Box 1 on page 4). People receiving 
those benefits also are eligible to collect an additional 
weekly payment of $25; payments for those supplements 
are scheduled to phase out beginning in March 2010. In 
addition, under amendments to the Consolidated Omni-
bus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA, Public 
Law 99-272), the government will pay for 65 percent of 
health insurance premiums for up to 15 months for indi-
viduals whose employment was involuntarily terminated 
between September 2008 and February 2010. The policy 
option analyzed by CBO would provide further assis-
tance to the unemployed by extending through Decem-
ber 2010 the benefits that will begin to phase out in 
March 2010 under current law; under this option, no 
added benefits would be paid after July 2011. 
Extending additional unemployment benefits would 
directly help those who would otherwise exhaust their 
unemployment benefits between March and December 
of this year. Households receiving unemployment bene-
fits tend to spend the additional benefits quickly, making 
this option both timely and cost-effective in spurring eco-
nomic activity and employment. A variant of this option 
would extend assistance with paying health insurance 
premiums, which would allow some recipients to main-
tain health insurance coverage they would otherwise have 
dropped. This variant would result in increased demand 
for health care services, and it would increase the income 
available to purchase other goods and services for recipi-
ents who would have purchased insurance even without 
this special assistance. Both policy options could dampen 
people’s efforts to look for work, although that concern is 
less of a factor when employment opportunities are 
expected to be limited for some time. 
CBO estimates that the policies would raise output 
cumulatively between 2010 and 2015 by $0.70 to $1.90 
per dollar of total budgetary cost. CBO also estimates 
that the policies would add 8 to 19 cumulative years of 
full-time-equivalent employment in 2010 and 2011 per 
million dollars of total budgetary cost.
Reducing Employers’ Payroll Taxes. Social Security, 
which consists of Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability 
Insurance, is financed by payroll taxes. Under current law, 
both employers and employees pay 6.2 percent of an 
employee’s annual earnings up to a ceiling that is adjusted 
for wage growth and equals $106,800 in 2010. CBO 
analyzed an option that would reduce employers’ payroll 
taxes for 2010. 
Firms would probably respond to this temporary reduc-
tion in their portion of the payroll tax through a combi-
nation of four channels. First, some firms would respond 
to lower employment costs by reducing the prices they 
charge in order to sell more goods or services. Those 
higher sales would in turn spur production, which would 
then increase hours worked and hiring. Second, some 
firms would pass the tax savings on to employees in the 
form of higher wages or other forms of compensation, 
which in turn encourage more spending by those employ-
ees. However, wages tend to be inflexible in the short run 
because of negotiation and administrative costs, so that 
response is not likely to be very large. Third, some firms 
would retain the tax savings as profits. Higher profits 
would raise companies’ stock prices, and the resulting 
higher household wealth would encourage more con-
sumption, although shareholders are likely to spend only 
a small portion of their gains. Higher profits would also 
improve cash flow, enabling firms facing borrowing con-
straints to buy new equipment. Fourth, some firms 
would use slightly more labor during a period when it 
was temporarily less expensive. However, most of the 
money forgone by the government would go to reduce 
taxes for existing workers, so—per dollar of forgone reve-
nue—the added incentive to increase employment and 
hours worked would be small. (For discussion of CBO’s 
modeling approach for the effects of reduced labor costs, 
see Box 4 on page 14.)
CBO estimates that reducing employers’ payroll taxes 
would raise output cumulatively between 2010 and 2015 
by $0.40 to $1.20 per dollar of total budgetary cost. 
CBO also estimates that the policy would add 5 to 13 
cumulative years of full-time-equivalent employment in 
2010 and 2011 per million dollars of total budgetary 
cost.
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Reducing Employers’ Payroll Taxes for Firms That 
Increase Their Payroll. In the late 1970s, the New Jobs 
Tax Credit was enacted in order to increase employment 
by reducing labor costs (see Box 5). CBO analyzed a 
related policy that would give employers a one-year non-
refundable credit against their payroll tax liability for 
incremental increases in their payrolls during 2010. 
Because the credit would be nonrefundable, the credit 
Box 5.
The New Jobs Tax Credit in 1977 and 1978
In response to the slow recovery in the labor market 
after the recession of 1973–1975, the New Jobs Tax 
Credit was created to encourage the hiring of addi-
tional workers. Under the program, firms that 
increased total employment by at least 2 percent 
received a credit corresponding to half the increase in 
their FUTA (Federal Unemployment Tax Act) wage 
base above 102 percent of the previous year’s base. 
The maximum credit was $2,100 per worker (about 
$7,000 in 2009 dollars). The total credits for a firm 
were capped at the lesser of 25 percent of the covered 
wage bill or $100,000. Those restrictions were 
meant to reduce the per-worker credit for new firms 
and large firms. Also, the credit could not be more 
than half the difference between the current year’s 
total wage bill and 105 percent of the previous year’s 
wage bill. That restriction was intended to discourage 
firms from firing their current full-time workers and 
replacing them with twice as many part-time 
workers. 
The complexity of the New Jobs Tax Credit may have 
discouraged some firms, especially small ones, from 
using the credit when making hiring decisions. A sur-
vey in 1978 by the Bureau of the Census showed that 
about one-quarter of firms who knew about the 
credit did not know whether they qualified. Data 
from tax returns also indicated that small firms were 
much less likely to participate in the program than 
were large firms. The participation rate among eligi-
ble firms was less than 2 percent for firms with total 
receipts below $25,000 in 1977 and more than 
80 percent for those with total receipts above 
$100 million.1 
Assessments of the program’s impact are inconclusive. 
At its peak, the program directly subsidized about 
2.1 million new workers, but the net number of jobs 
induced is unclear. One study using data from a sur-
vey by the Bureau of the Census indicated that firms 
that knew about the program hired 3 percent more 
workers than did firms that reported not knowing 
about it, but only 6 percent of the firms who knew 
about the credit said that it had prompted them to 
hire more workers.2 Another study using the same 
survey data concluded that the program was responsi-
ble for a significant share of the increase in employ-
ment in the construction and distribution industries 
between mid-1977 and mid-1978.3 However, those 
gains in employment may have been offset by losses 
in other firms and industries. A report by the Depart-
ments of Labor and the Treasury later argued that the 
two studies could not determine whether the New 
Jobs Tax Credit increased aggregate employment, 
because it is impossible to observe what hiring would 
have been without the credit.4
1. Department of Labor and Department of the Treasury, The 
Use of Tax Subsidies for Employment: A Report to Congress 
(May 1986).
2. Jeffrey M. Perloff and Michael L. Wachter, “The New Jobs 
Tax Credit: An Evaluation of the 1977–78 Wage Subsidy 
Program,” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 
vol. 69, no. 2 (1979), pp. 173–179.
3. John Bishop, “Employment in Construction and Distribu-
tion Industries: The Impact of the New Jobs Tax Credit,” in 
Sherwin Rosen, ed., Studies in Labor Markets (Cambridge, 
Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1981), 
pp. 209–246.
4. Department of Labor and Department of the Treasury, The 
Use of Tax Subsidies for Employment.
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amount would not exceed the firm’s payroll tax liability. 
Such a credit could be based on payrolls in each calendar 
quarter so that firms could receive the credit quickly. To 
prevent firms from firing existing employees and hiring 
new ones, the credit could be based on the difference 
between the wage base in the current quarter and the 
wage base four quarters previously (the “reference 
period”). Also, to reduce the incentive for firms to delay 
hiring or to lower their wage base before the policy was 
implemented, the policy could be retroactive to the 
beginning of the quarter of enactment. In addition, the 
eligible wage base could be capped at an annual amount 
for each employee. Wage bases for the Federal Insurance 
Contributions Act (up to $106,800 in annual earnings 
for 2010) and the Federal Unemployment Tax Act (up to 
$7,000 in annual earnings) can be calculated quarterly for 
most employers from information already reported to the 
Internal Revenue Service, thus reducing the administra-
tive costs of this option. 
Providing tax credits for increases in payrolls would 
increase both output and employment. The effect on out-
put would come through the same four channels as the 
effect on output of reducing employers’ payroll taxes. 
CBO estimates that this option and the preceding one 
would have approximately the same economic impact per 
dollar of budgetary cost through the first three channels 
discussed above. Through the fourth channel, however, 
this option provides a substantially larger increase in 
employment and hours than the previous option because 
this policy would provide tax benefits linked to payroll 
growth; fewer budget dollars would be used to cut taxes 
for workers who would have been employed anyway, so 
the incentive to increase payroll per dollar of forgone rev-
enue would be greater. However, linking the availability 
of the credit to payroll growth would provide no incen-
tive to maintain employment at firms that have been con-
tracting and thus less incentive to maintain employment 
overall in industries and regions where the economy 
remains the weakest.
The choice of what cap (if any) to impose on the eligible 
wage base would affect the types of employment the pol-
icy would foster. A low cap would especially encourage 
the hiring of low-wage and part-time workers. For 
example, if the credit was calculated using the Federal 
Unemployment Tax Act wage base, firms might have 
incentives to hire, say, three part-time employees with 
annual wages of $20,000 each instead of one full-time 
employee with annual wages of $60,000, because the for-
mer would increase payroll by $21,000 for the purpose of 
the credit compared with an increase of only $7,000 for 
the latter. Thus, a lower cap would induce more hiring of 
new employees, and a higher cap would induce greater 
increases in hours per employee. 
Another design choice is whether the tax credit would be 
broad based or apply only to a subset of firms. For exam-
ple, if the main objective was to assist small businesses in 
hiring, the credit could be made available just for firms 
with a total number of employees, or total revenues, 
below some specified threshold. However, because small 
firms have more volatile employment dynamics (exhibit-
ing high rates of job creation and job loss along with high 
rates of firms entering and leaving the market), the aver-
age duration and hence the economic benefits of each 
subsidized job are likely to be shorter and smaller than 
those under a broad-based program. In addition, because 
of that volatility, a greater fraction of the tax credits 
would be paid in response to payroll growth that would 
have occurred even without the policy.
The effects of tax credits also would depend on other 
design choices. To reduce efforts by firms to maximize 
their credits in ways inconsistent with the intent of the 
policy, growth through acquisition of existing firms 
might be deemed not to count as a net increase in 
employment; however, such restrictions would make the 
policy more difficult to administer. If the credit was non-
refundable and was applied against businesses’ income tax 
liability instead of their payroll tax liability, the policy 
would have a smaller effect: Employers that did not owe 
any income taxes—including firms with net operating 
losses, tax-exempt organizations, and state and local gov-
ernments—would not be eligible for the credit. Firms 
with net operating losses could be allowed to apply the 
credit to tax liabilities in a subsequent year; still, among 
firms with net operating losses, the effect on hiring would 
be smaller because the credit would not be received 
immediately even if their payrolls increased in 2010.
CBO estimates that reducing payroll taxes for firms that 
increase their payrolls would raise output cumulatively 
between 2010 and 2015 by $0.40 to $1.30 per dollar
of total budgetary cost. CBO also estimates that the 
policy would add 8 to 18 cumulative years of full-time-
equivalent employment in 2010 and 2011 per million 
dollars of total budgetary cost.
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Reducing Employees’ Payroll Taxes. Under current law, 
employees pay 6.2 percent of their annual earnings in 
Social Security payroll taxes up to a ceiling that is 
adjusted for wage growth and equals $106,800 in 2010. 
Self-employed workers pay 12.4 percent of their earnings 
up to the same ceiling. This option would reduce these 
taxes for 2010. 
A temporary reduction in the employees’ portion of the 
payroll tax would not immediately affect employers’ 
costs. Instead, it would have initial effects similar to those 
of reducing other taxes for people below the 2010 income 
cap. The increase in take-home pay would spur addi-
tional spending by the households receiving the higher 
income, and that higher spending would, in turn, 
increase production and employment. Those effects will 
be spread over time, however, and the majority of the 
increased take-home pay would be saved rather than 
spent. 
CBO estimates that reducing employees’ payroll taxes 
would raise output cumulatively between 2010 and 2015 
by $0.30 to $0.90 per dollar of total budgetary cost. 
CBO also estimates that the policy would add 3 to 9 
cumulative years of full-time-equivalent employment in 
2010 and 2011 per million dollars of total budgetary 
cost. 
In comparison with the effects of reducing employees’ 
payroll taxes, the effects of reducing employers’ payroll 
taxes are somewhat larger per dollar of forgone revenue. 
Reducing employers’ payroll taxes for one year has an 
economic effect related to that of a temporary cut in sales 
taxes because a temporary reduction in prices (the first 
channel described in the section on reducing employers’ 
payroll taxes) would encourage purchases while the 
reduction was in effect. The effects on spending, output, 
and employment through this channel are estimated to 
be somewhat larger than the corresponding effects of 
increases in take-home pay from reducing employees’ 
payroll taxes.
Providing An Additional One-Time Social Security 
Payment. Income tax reductions and additional unem-
ployment benefits would have small effects on senior citi-
zens because many of them do not pay income taxes and 
most are not in the labor force. One way to reach senior 
citizens is to provide direct payments. In 2009, for exam-
ple, ARRA provided $250 in additional income to each 
senior citizen who received Social Security benefits in any 
month between November 2008 and January 2009 and 
to certain other retirees and disabled veterans.14 This 
option would provide an additional one-time Social 
Security payment in 2010.
An additional payment of this sort in 2010 would 
increase demand to the extent that the recipients spend 
the additional income. Many of the elderly save at rates 
similar to those of the working-age population, suggest-
ing that part of the additional income to seniors would 
not be spent (or at least not spent quickly) and part 
would. Hence, the option would probably have a moder-
ate effect on demand and thus a moderate effect on out-
put and employment. 
CBO estimates that an additional Social Security pay-
ment in 2010 would raise output cumulatively between 
2010 and 2015 by $0.30 to $0.90 per dollar of total
budgetary cost and would add 3 to 9 cumulative years of 
full-time-equivalent employment in 2010 and 2011 per 
million dollars of total budgetary cost.
Allowing Full or Partial Expensing of Investment Costs. 
ARRA raised the maximum amount a firm can expense 
to $250,000 for equipment purchased in 2009. The 
amount that could be expensed phased out dollar for 
dollar for purchase amounts above $800,000, so the pro-
vision targeted relatively small firms. ARRA also extended 
to the end of 2009 the additional first-year depreciation 
of 50 percent for qualified investments that was first 
instituted in 2008. CBO analyzed a policy option to 
provide further incentives to invest by extending both 
provisions in ARRA for one more year. 
Partial expensing (sometimes called “bonus deprecia-
tion”) or full expensing of investment costs allows firms 
to realize the tax benefits of depreciation deductions more 
quickly, which provides a greater incentive for investment 
because a dollar of tax benefit this year is more valuable 
than a dollar of tax benefit in a future year. The effect of 
the incentive may be smaller when the economy is weak 
than when it is strong: Firms may be less likely to increase 
14. Social Security beneficiaries received a cost-of-living adjustment in 
2009 that was larger than usual because a run-up in oil prices 
boosted the consumer price index. The subsequent decline in oil 
prices pushed down the consumer price index. If the rules for 
Social Security benefits treated increases and decreases in prices 
symmetrically, the cost-of-living adjustment in 2010 would have 
been negative; however, the rules do not operate in that way, so 
beneficiaries received no cost-of-living adjustment in 2010.
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investment when they have idle capacity and when they 
are less confident about the future demand for their prod-
ucts and services. In addition, when the economy slows, 
more firms incur losses and pay no income tax; some of 
those firms therefore get less benefit from immediate tax 
deductions, although firms that paid taxes in previous 
years may be able to reclaim some of those taxes. To the 
extent that temporarily reducing the after-tax price of 
investment accelerates the purchase of capital goods into 
the period when the credit is available, that increased 
investment may be partially offset by a subsequent 
decrease when the credit expires. In addition, the policy 
would probably have the greatest effect on investment 
just before it expired at the end of 2010 (as firms acceler-
ated equipment purchases from 2011), so much of the 
indirect effects on output and employment would spill 
over into 2011. 
CBO estimates that allowing full or partial expensing 
would raise output cumulatively between 2010 and 2015 
by $0.20 to $1.00 per dollar of total budgetary cost. 
CBO also estimates that the policy would add 2 to 9 
cumulative years of full-time-equivalent employment in 
2010 and 2011 per million dollars of total budgetary 
cost.
Policy Options with a Substantial Proportion of 
Impacts Beginning in 2011
Among the policy options considered here, those that 
were estimated to have a substantial proportion of their 
impacts beginning in 2011 are investing in infrastructure, 
providing aid to states for purposes other than infrastruc-
ture, providing additional refundable tax credits for 
lower- and middle-income households in 2011, extend-
ing higher exemption amounts for the AMT in 2010, 
and reducing income taxes in 2011. 
Investing in Infrastructure. ARRA appropriated about 
$60 billion for spending on water, transportation, and 
housing projects. CBO analyzed a policy option that 
would boost the demand for goods and services and 
thereby increase output and employment by providing 
additional increases in federal funding for infrastructure 
projects.
Infrastructure spending directly increases employment 
because workers are hired to undertake construction proj-
ects. It also adds to demand for goods and services 
through purchases of material and equipment and 
through additional spending by the extra workers who are 
hired; as with other policy options discussed in this paper, 
that increase in demand leads to further hiring. One 
drawback of this option is that infrastructure projects 
often involve considerable start-up lags. To be sure, some 
projects, such as highway repair and resurfacing, can be 
implemented relatively quickly. However, large-scale con-
struction projects generally require years of planning and 
preparation; for example, building new transportation 
infrastructure that requires establishing new rights-of-way 
and developing and implementing alternative energy 
sources would probably have their biggest effects on out-
put and employment after the recovery was well along. As 
a practical matter, the experience with ARRA suggests 
that fewer projects are “shovel ready” than one might 
expect: By the end of fiscal year 2009, outlays for infra-
structure spending from ARRA made up less than 10 per-
cent of the budget authority granted for infrastructure in 
that year. Moreover, given the substantial increase in 
infrastructure funding provided by ARRA, achieving sig-
nificant increases in outlays above the amounts funded by 
ARRA would probably take even longer. Thus, most of 
the increases in output and employment from this option 
would probably occur after 2011. 
CBO estimates that additional investments in infrastruc-
ture would raise output cumulatively between 2010 
and 2015 by $0.50 to $1.20 per dollar of total budgetary 
cost and would add 2 to 4 cumulative years of full-time-
equivalent employment in 2010 and 2011 per million 
dollars of total budgetary cost. 
Providing Aid to States for Purposes Other Than Infra-
structure. Many states have experienced a high degree of 
fiscal stress and are expected to have large budget gaps in 
the next few years. Eighteen states have budget gaps 
larger than 20 percent of general fund expenditures. 
Those budget gaps have occurred despite more than 
$200 billion provided to state governments by ARRA for 
purposes other than infrastructure. CBO analyzed a pol-
icy to further assist states by providing funding to state 
governments for a variety of purposes. Even if funding 
were intended for a specific activity, such as education or 
health care, CBO anticipates that the availability of those 
additional funds would both increase net state spending 
for that activity and affect other aspects of state budgets. 
Without further aid from the federal government, many 
states would have to raise taxes or cut spending by more 
than they would if aid were provided. Such actions would 
dampen spending by those governments and by house-
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holds in those states, and more state and private jobs 
would be lost. Under current policies, states will be tak-
ing such balancing actions on an ongoing basis, so federal 
aid that was provided promptly would probably have a 
significant effect on output and employment in 2010 and 
2011. Such aid could lead to fewer layoffs, more pay 
raises, more government purchases of goods and services, 
increases in state safety-net programs, tax cuts, and sav-
ings for future use.
CBO estimates that providing aid to states for purposes 
other than infrastructure would raise output cumulatively 
between 2010 and 2015 by $0.40 to $1.10 per dollar of 
total budgetary cost. CBO also estimates that the policy 
would add 3 to 7 cumulative years of full-time-equivalent 
employment in 2010 and 2011 per million dollars of 
total budgetary cost.
Providing Additional Refundable Tax Credits for 
Lower- and Middle-Income Households in 2011. Some 
tax credits are refundable—that is, the government makes 
cash payments to people who do not have enough 
income to pay income taxes. ARRA contains several 
provisions for reducing taxes for individuals and families 
in 2009 and 2010 that serve as examples of refundable 
credits that could be provided again in 2011. One such 
provision is the Making Work Pay credit, which provides 
a tax credit of up to $400 for individuals and up to 
$800 for married taxpayers filing joint returns; that credit 
is phased out as income exceeds $75,000 ($150,000 for 
joint filers). Another provision temporarily increased the 
earned income tax credit for taxpayers with three or more 
qualifying children and raised the threshold at which the 
amount of the credit begins to be reduced for married 
couples filing jointly. Yet another provision modified the 
existing Hope credit (a federal tax credit for education 
expenses of students meeting certain criteria) in 2009 and 
2010 to make the credit partially refundable, providing 
education tax benefits to a larger group of taxpayers 
and allowing the credit to be claimed for four years of 
postsecondary education instead of two. CBO analyzed 
an option to extend those credits through 2011. 
Refundable credits are often phased out when income 
increases above some amount and thus are effectively lim-
ited to lower- and middle- income households. Moreover, 
credits that are refundable provide a larger income boost 
to those households than do comparable credits that are 
not refundable, because lower-income households are 
more likely not to owe income tax. Therefore, providing 
additional refundable credits would increase after-tax 
income for households that are more likely than average 
to be restricted in their consumption by their current 
income and hence would spend a greater share of the 
funds received. As a result, such credits would increase 
output and employment by more per dollar of budgetary 
cost than would cutting taxes for a broader set of taxpay-
ers whose consumption is less likely to be restrained by 
their current income.
CBO estimates that providing additional refundable tax 
credits would raise output cumulatively between 2010 
and 2015 by $0.30 to $0.90 per dollar of total budgetary 
cost. CBO also estimates that the policy would add 3 to 6 
cumulative years of full-time-equivalent employment in 
2010 and 2011 per million dollars of total budgetary 
cost.
Extending Higher Exemption Amounts for the Alternative 
Minimum Tax. The alternative minimum tax was origi-
nally intended to impose taxes on high-income individu-
als who used tax preferences to greatly reduce or eliminate 
their liability under the regular income tax. For most of 
its existence, the AMT has played a minor role in the tax 
system, accounting for less than 2 percent of individual 
income tax revenues and affecting less than 1 percent of 
taxpayers in any year before 2000. However, unlike the 
regular income tax, the AMT is not indexed for inflation. 
As a result, the AMT would affect significantly larger 
numbers of taxpayers over time, and lawmakers have 
intervened each year since 2001 to slow the expansion of 
the AMT and prevent it from affecting more taxpayers 
outside of the higher-income groups. At the expiration of 
each of those annual “patches,” the exemptions would 
have reverted to their prior-law levels, so the prospective 
year-to-year change in tax revenue if current law regard-
ing the AMT was maintained has become larger each 
year. In 2010, under current law, the AMT will affect 
about 17 percent of taxpayers (up from less than 3 per-
cent in 2009), paying on average $3,900 more in tax than 
they would under the regular income tax system; nearly 
every married taxpayer filing jointly with income between 
$100,000 and $500,000 will owe some alternative tax. 
The option considered here would reduce taxes by mak-
ing another adjustment to the amount of income that is 
exempt from the AMT during 2010 only.
The impact of this option on consumption is likely to be 
limited, because the AMT largely affects people in the 
upper half of the income distribution, and their con-
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sumption is unlikely to be constrained by their income in 
a given year. In addition, although the AMT extension 
would affect tax liability in 2010, most of its impact on 
consumption would probably occur in 2011. The effect 
would be delayed both because many taxpayers are 
allowed to pay their 2010 AMT liability in 2011 and 
because the increase in liability in 2010 would probably 
not be recognized immediately. In particular, taxpayers 
who have not previously paid the AMT may not know 
that they are becoming liable, and those previously liable 
for the AMT probably expect that another extension will 
be enacted; for both of those groups, the AMT liability 
under current law would not affect their consumption 
much until 2011, so changing the law would also not 
have much effect on their consumption until 2011.
CBO estimates that a one-year AMT patch would raise 
output cumulatively between 2010 and 2015 by $0.10 to 
$0.40 per dollar of total budgetary cost. CBO also 
estimates that the policy would add 1 to 4 cumulative 
years of full-time-equivalent employment in 2010 and 
2011 per million dollars of total budgetary cost.
Reducing Income Taxes in 2011. Various provisions of 
the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act 
of 2001 (EGTRRA) and the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2003 (JGTRRA) will expire at the 
end of 2010, raising tax liabilities for most people (see 
Box 2 on page 6). If policymakers wanted to avoid 
increasing taxes during a period of economic weakness, 
they could defer those increases as well as extend the 
higher exemption amounts for the AMT. Accordingly, 
CBO analyzed a policy that would defer the scheduled 
2011 income tax increases in EGTRRA and JGTRRA for 
one year and would increase the exemption amounts for 
the AMT in 2010 and 2011. 
As compared with the one-year AMT patch, a greater 
share of the tax reduction from this option would benefit 
households who are somewhat farther down the income 
scale and therefore would probably spend a larger fraction 
of an increase in after-tax income. Still, only a fraction of 
the tax cut in this option would be received by those 
whose consumption is restricted by their current dispos-
able income. 
Deferring the scheduled increases in tax rates in 2011 
would help some businesses as well as households. In par-
ticular, it would keep lower tax rates in place in that year 
for businesses that do not pay the corporate income tax 
(the pass-through entities such as sole proprietorships, 
partnerships, S corporations, and limited liability compa-
nies). However, increasing the after-tax income of busi-
nesses typically does not create much incentive for them 
to hire more workers in order to produce more, because 
production depends principally on their ability to sell 
their products. 
The economic effects of this option relative to those of 
the one-year AMT patch are influenced by two additional 
factors. First, the effects would occur later, because the 
option would primarily reduce taxes in 2011 and much 
of the economic impact would not be felt until 2012. 
Second, because the economic effects would be delayed, 
more of them would occur in a period when CBO 
assumes that the Federal Reserve will begin to offset stim-
ulative fiscal policy actions in order to avoid increasing 
the risk of excessive inflation (as discussed in Box 4 on 
page 14). That response would reduce the overall boost to 
growth and employment from this option.
CBO estimates that a two-year AMT patch and one-year 
deferral of the EGTRRA and JGTRRA tax increases 
would raise output cumulatively between 2010 and 2015 
by $0.10 to $0.40 per dollar of total budgetary cost. 
CBO also estimates that the policy would add 1 to 3 
cumulative years of full-time-equivalent employment in 
2010 and 2011 per million dollars of total budgetary 
cost. Although the effects of this policy per dollar of bud-
getary cost are smaller than the effects of extending 
ARRA’s tax credits, the dollar amount of tax cuts under 
this option is substantially larger, so the total effects on 
output and employment also would be larger. 
One variant on this option is to defer most of the tax 
increases in EGTRRA and JGTRRA for one year but 
allow the rate increases for the top brackets to go into 
effect. This option would cost less than would deferring 
all of the scheduled tax increases, and it would be more 
cost-effective because the higher-income households that 
would be excluded would probably save a larger fraction 
of their increase in after-tax income. However, the differ-
ence relative to the option analyzed here would be small, 
because much of the remaining tax reduction would still 
go to higher-income taxpayers—largely because of the 
changes in the AMT and other income tax changes.
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A related option is to permanently eliminate the sched-
uled tax increases in EGTRRA and JGTRRA. A perma-
nent extension would have a bigger effect on demand in 
2011 than would a temporary extension, because house-
holds that expected higher after-tax income in subsequent 
years would spend a larger share of the additional income 
they receive in 2011. However, a permanent extension 
would entail large revenue losses after the recovery is over, 
so its effects on output and employment in the next few 
years per dollar of total budgetary cost would be much 
lower than those of the one-year deferral analyzed here.
